Abstract -Market power exercised by firms has become central to macroeconomics. Recent theoretical work highlights the importance of the relation between market power and inflation. We examine this relation for individual firms in eleven U.S. industries. Our econometric framework exploits restrictions from dynamic theory and information from financial markets to generate quantitative evidence on the responsiveness of market power to inflation. We find that inflation usually has a positive effect on market power. This relation is heterogeneous across the eleven industries, and statistically significant positive relations are concentrated in industries with little market power.
I. Introduction
Market power exercised by firms has become central to macroeconomics. Hall (1986 Hall ( , 1988 demonstrates how substantial market power and declining or flat marginal costs attenuate firms' incentive to alter prices, thus contributing to aggregate fluctuations. In general equilibrium frameworks, market power heightens the sensitivity of output and employment to demand policies (Hart, 1982; Blanchard & Kiyotaki, 1987) and enhances the ability of calibrated models to mimic the data (Rotemberg & Woodford, 1996) . Additional work (surveyed by Rotemberg & Woodford (1991 , 1999 ) emphasizes that cyclical variation in market power can attenuate or amplify the equilibrium impact of macro shocks.
Market power may be sensitive to inflation, thus creating an additional channel by which inflation directly affects the macroeconomy. 1 In a series of papers, Bénabou (1988 Bénabou ( , 1992a Bénabou ( , 1992b links the welfare costs of inflation to its impact on market power. When monopolistically competitive firms set prices with (S, s) rules, he shows that inflation increases the dispersion of prices within an industry. Consequently, buyers devote more resources to search and, for a given level of market power, inflation lowers welfare. However, additional search may reduce market power and lessen resource misallocation. On balance, the welfare effects of inflation are ambiguous, and depend critically on the sign of the relation between market power and inflation. In Ball and Romer (1996) and Tommassi (1994) , inflation lowers welfare by increasing relative price variability, reducing the information about future prices contained in current prices, and thus allowing firms to raise markups on less informed and less price-elastic consumers.
With the exception of Bénabou (1992b) , the market power/inflation relation has not been investigated empirically. This paper examines this relation for individual firms in eleven U.S. industries. Section II describes our analytic framework measuring market power with a three-equation econometric model and briefly discusses our firm-level data. Section III presents our basic empirical findings: market power is positively related to inflation; this relation is heterogeneous across the eleven industries; and statistically significant positive relations are concentrated in industries with little market power. Several alternative explanations are examined, and our empirical results prove robust. Section IV summarizes.
II. Econometric Framework

A. System Specification
We exploit restrictions from dynamic theory and information from financial markets to generate quantitative evidence on the responsiveness of market power to inflation. The model employed in this paper utilizes the substantial information in firm-level panel data, and is developed in detail in Chirinko and Fazzari (1994) . We provide only a sketch of the framework here.
Firms choose variable inputs (labor plus materials) and capital to maximize net present value. Output is determined by a homogeneous translog technology with nonconstant returns to scale and Hicksneutral technical progress. Firms face convex costs of adjusting capital. In general, firms have market power and face a downwardsloping demand curve. The first-order conditions for optimization and the transversality condition for the capital stock generate three estimating equations (presented in appendix A). The first equation equates short-run marginal revenue and marginal cost. The second equation is the capital Euler equation equating the marginal returns to the quasi-fixed stock of capital in adjacent time periods. The third equation is based on the Q theory of investment. Because we allow for the possibility of imperfect competition and nonconstant returns to scale, the usual relation between investment and Q contains an additional term involving the discounted sum of quasi-rents associated with departures from constant returns or perfect competition.
The Lerner index for firm j at time t, ⍜ jt , is the percentage differential between price and marginal cost. This index measures market power, enters the marginal revenue/marginal cost and Q equations, and equals 0 for competitive firms, 2
The first term in equation (1) 
We estimate the three-equation system with nonlinear three-stage least squares. Under the assumption of rational expectations, lagged values of the model variables are valid instruments (listed in appendix A). In addition, we include the lagged level and change in the firm's employment, firm dummies, and a time trend as instruments.
B. Data
We present estimates with firm-level data (drawn from Value Line) for eleven manufacturing industries listed in table 1 by SIC code. The selected industries represent all four-digit manufacturing industries from Value Line that had enough firms for estimation. These industries can be perfectly competitive, monopolistically competitive, or characterized by some other form of rivalrous behavior and, under any of these interpretations, ⍜ measures market power. After the variables are transformed and the instruments lagged, the sample period is 1975 to 1985. See Chirinko and Fazzari (1994, section 5 and their Data Appendix) for a detailed description of the data. Inflation is measured as the percentage change in the implicit deflator for gross domestic product, except in table 2, column (7), where we measure inflation with the PPI for finished goods excluding foods and energy. Table 2 contains the estimated parameters representing the industry Lerner index (⍜) and its responsiveness to inflation (⍜ ) for eleven industries. 3 (The industries are arranged from the least to the most competitive, where competitiveness is determined by the value of the Lerner index evaluated at zero inflation in column (2).) In nine of the eleven industries, inflation has a positive effect on market power, and ⍜ is statistically different from zero (at the 10% level) in six cases. The significant ⍜ 's tend to be in relatively competitive industries. The estimates in table 2 reveal a noticeable amount of heterogeneity in the ⍜ 's. This diversity suggests the sensitivity of ⍜ to product market structure and, hence, the importance of examining market power at fine levels of disaggregation.
III. Empirical Results
A. Basic Findings
Heterogeneity is also evident when we examine the economic impact of inflation on market power. The entries in columns (3) and (4) evaluate ⍜ at different inflation rates: the average rate for the sample period (6.1%) and the difference between the maximum (9.9%) and minimum (3.5%) values of inflation. In three industries, market power varies substantially; the change in ⍜ when inflation is at its maximum and minimum rate exceeds nine percentage points. For five other industries, the changes are much smaller, and are less than three percentage points.
Bénabou examines one industry (the retail trade sector, SIC codes 52 through 59) for the period 1948 to 1985 that, to the best of our knowledge, is the only other empirical study of market power and inflation. He finds that market power is negatively related to inflation. The most relevant comparison is with our results from industry 2082 that also has a significantly negative ⍜ and shares three striking similarities with Bénabou's retail trade sector. First, estimates of market power at zero inflation are nearly identical: 0.403 in Bénabou (1992b, p. 570) and 0.416 in table 1, column (2). Second, market power is countercyclical in both industries. 4 Third, search costs are low in the retail trade sector and, among the eleven industries studied here, industry 2082 (malt beverages, a relatively homogenous product) is likely to have one of the lowest search costs.
B. Alternative Interpretations
These findings are open to alternative interpretations, and four are explored here. The computer revolution and other major technological developments could reflect biased technical progress. (See Blanchard (1997) for further discussion.) In this case, definitions of marginal cost and the marginal rate of substitution in the econometric equations are incomplete, and parameter estimates are adversely affected. In particular, estimates of ⍜ may be seriously affected insofar as inflation has a secular component correlated with the technology index and technical progress has been biased. Our model is based on a translog technology and provides a natural way for accounting for biased technical change. We augment the translog technology with interaction terms between technology (proxied by a time trend) and the output and capital variables that determine variable factor requirements. (See appendix A for specific additions.) Estimates of ⍜ based on this expanded model are presented in table 2, column (5). Allowing for biased technical change leads to a uniformly positive increase in the relation between market power and inflation. In several cases, changes in ⍜ are substantial, and an additional industry (2300) now emerges with a positive and statistically significant ⍜ . Biased technical change, rather than undermining the prior results, actually strengthens our finding of a positive relation between market power and inflation. A second alternative interpretation is that the effects of inflation are masked by the cyclical component of the Lerner index. Insofar as inflation is partly cyclical, interactions between inflation and the included cyclical variable may bias estimates of ⍜ . To explore this possibility, we constrain ⍜ c to zero, and report results for this restricted model in column (6) of table 2. (Note that ⍜ c ϭ 0 is rejected in eight industries.) The results prove robust with the exception of industries 2834 (pharmaceuticals), 3011 (tires), and 3714 (motor vehicle parts). These latter two industries are associated with the cyclically sensitive production of automobiles; hence, the elimination of the cyclical effect is particularly important. Although this restricted model is rejected by the data, it nonetheless highlights the robustness of our results.
The third alternative interpretation is that the positive ⍜ reflects the upsurge of oil prices during our sample period, rather than a general relation between market power and inflation. In a dynamic general equilibrium model, Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) present simulations that yield a positive relation between market power and oil price inflation. To remove the effect of oil prices, we replace the GDP inflation measure with one calculated with the PPI for finished goods excluding foods and energy. The results are presented in column (7) of table 2. In ten of the eleven industries, the estimate of ⍜ is lower, thus confirming the positive effect indicated by the Rotemberg and Woodford simulations. Even with this oil price effect removed, however, inflation continues to exert a significantly positive effect on market power in five industries. These results support both Rotemberg and Woodford's oil price effect and our conclusion that inflation usually has a positive impact on market power.
Finally, all of the results could be affected by specification error from a variety of sources. Of particular concern for the current study is that the Lerner index (1) may be subject to measurement error because it is not derived from a specific optimization problem (cf. note 2). We examine the impact of this and other forms of specification error on the key coefficient, ⍜ , in two ways. First, to attenuate possible correlation between the instruments and specification error, the instruments are lagged an additional period. The point estimates of ⍜ are very similar to those in column (1) of table 2. Second, we use a Hausman test that compares estimates from 2SLS and 3SLS and that allows us to focus on ⍜ . 5 For ten of the eleven industries, the p-values from this Hausman test exceed 10%. For the exceptional industry (2621), the difference in the ⍜ 's is small. Thus, the positive relation between market power and inflation reported in this paper does not appear to be sensitive to specification error in the Lerner index or other parts of the equation system.
IV. Summary
This paper explores the relation between market power and inflation in an econometric framework that exploits restrictions from 5 Under the null of no misspecification, the 2SLS and 3SLS estimates are asymptotically equivalent, but the latter is more efficient. Under the alternative of, for example, misspecification in the Lerner index, only a subset of parameters would be inconsistently estimated under 2SLS, but all 3SLS parameter estimates would be inconsistent because misspecification in one equation is transmitted to all equations via the estimated residual covariance matrix (Hausman, 1978 (Hausman, , pp. 1264 (Hausman, -1266 . The test statistic for ⍜ ϳ 2 (1). (White, 1982) appear in parentheses. ⍜ measures the response of the Lerner index to inflation (). The ⍜'s in columns (2) through (4) are the industry Lerner indices averaged over the sample for different values of . The standard errors for ⍜ are computed from the covariance matrix of the estimated ⍜j's and ⍜. Column (5) expands the translog technology to allow for biased technical change. Column (6) constrains the cyclical component (⍜C) to zero. Column (7) measures inflation with the PPI for finished goods excluding foods and energy. The entries are ordered by the value of ⍜ in column (2).
* Statistically significant ⍜'s at the 10% level.
dynamic theory and information from financial markets. Firm-level data from eleven industries are analyzed, and the following stylized facts emerge.
1) Inflation usually has a positive effect on market power.
2) The market power/inflation relation is heterogeneous across the eleven industries. 3) Statistically significant positive relations are concentrated in industries with little market power.
These results prove robust to the introduction of biased technical change, the removal of the cyclical effect, and the exclusion of energy prices. These findings, combined with recent theoretical work, suggest an important channel for understanding the welfare costs of inflation. Additional work investigating the market power/inflation relation would begin by expanding the data set to obtain a broader representation of the economy and by examining the robustness of our findings to alternative technologies (such as, nonconvex adjustment costs and irreversibilities). 6 The endogenous search model of Bénabou (1992a) provides an excellent vehicle for relating market power to inflation and product market structure, and his optimizing model could provide the basis for a more-detailed specification of market power. Lastly, recent theoretical models and the heterogeneity of the empirical results presented in this paper suggest that the market power/inflation relation is sensitive to product market structure and thus requires further exploration with a broader set of industries and measures of market characteristics.
, where r tϩ1 is the discount rate and X t is any model variable.
The third equation is a quasi-differenced Q equation:
where Q jtϪ1 is the difference between the financial value of the firm and the replacement value of capital at the end of period t Ϫ 1. (The effects of measurement error in Q are attenuated by normalizing equation (A3) by Q; see Chirinko (1993) .) The operator ⌬ Q 5X t 6 equals [X t Ϫ (X tϩ1 /(1 ϩ r tϩ1 ))].
The parameter gives the degree of homogeneity of the production technology minus one, and equals zero for constant returns to scale.
Homogeneity of the technology implies the following restrictions:
and
To allow for capital-biased technical change, we add Ϫ Y *TIME t and Ϫ K *TIME t to the terms in brackets with ␣ Y in equation (A1) 
IS ALL PUBLIC CAPITAL CREATED EQUAL?
Alfredo M. Pereira* Abstract -This paper uses a VAR approach to investigate the effects of public investment on private-sector performance in the United States. This approach is consistent with the argument that the analysis of these effects requires the consideration of dynamic feedbacks among the different variables. Estimation results suggest that all types of public investment have a positive effect on private output. Core infrastructure investment in electric and gas facilities, transit systems, and airfields, as well as in sewage and water supply systems display the highest rates of return, 16.1% and 9.7%, respectively, closely followed by investment in educational, hospital, and other public buildings with 8.9%.
I. Introduction
The empirical evaluation of the effects of public capital formation on private output was brought to the limelight by the work of Aschauer. (See Hulten and Schwab (1993) for a comprehensive discussion of the main issues in the infrastructure debate.) Using a single-equation static production function approach based on aggregate measures of public capital, Aschauer (1989a Aschauer ( , 1989b suggests that public capital has been a powerful engine for growth in the United States. In fact, his results suggest that public capital would pay for itself close to three times in the form of additional tax revenues. (See Reich (1991) .) Subsequent analysis applying the same methodology to international, regional, and sector-specific data, however, failed to replicate such large effects of aggregate public capital on private output. Indeed, it often even failed to find meaningful positive effects. (See Gramlich (1994) and Munnell (1992) for detailed surveys of this literature.) Probably due to this lack of consensus on the issue of the effects of aggregate public capital, the issue of the relative productivity of different types of public capital has been largely neglected. (See Aschauer (1990 ), Cullison (1993 , Evans and Karras (1994), and Finn (1993) , for exceptions.)
The approach used in Aschauer (1989a Aschauer ( , 1989b and most of the literature that followed has been criticized on econometric grounds. It has been observed that the estimation of static, univariate production functions in levels (or log-levels) is based on nonstationary variables. Therefore, OLS estimates are spurious in the absence of cointegration. Moreover, OLS estimates suffer from simultaneity bias. Even if this bias is corrected, conclusions about causality still cannot be drawn. (See Jorgenson (1991) and Munnell (1992) for comprehensive discussion of these econometric problems.)
In this paper, we analyze the impact of public capital formation on private-sector performance, first at the aggregate level and then considering different types of public investment. We follow Pereira and Flores (1999) and adopt a multivariate time-series framework. This approach allows us to address the aforementioned econometric criticisms in a rigorous and comprehensive manner. It also brings a more precise conceptual focus to the debate about whether or not public capital is productive. In fact, the static single-equation framework typically used in the literature excludes the presence of feedbacks, and in particular dynamic feedbacks, among the relevant variables. This exclusion is of paramount importance for it is likely that feedbacks exist. If they do, a zero elasticity of private output with respect to public capital (as obtained from a single-equation static production function approach) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for public capital to be ineffective in influencing output.
Dynamic feedbacks are essential to a conceptual understanding of the relationship between public capital and private-sector performance. Indeed, public capital affects private directly as an additional input in the production function. Moreover, as a positive externality to private production, public capital should, ceteris paribus, lead to higher private production. Public capital also affects private production indirectly via its effects on private inputs, capital, and labor. It is conceivable that a greater availability of public capital could reduce the demand for private inputs (a substitution effect). Higher availability of public capital, however, also increases the marginal productivity of private inputs. This lowers the marginal costs of production, thereby potentially increasing the level of private production (a scale effect).
The evolution of private inputs and outputs can, in turn, be expected to affect the formation of public capital. Indeed, increasing private output provides the government with a growing tax base and the potential for greater investment. Furthermore, declining private employment has often led to short-term policy packages that involve increased public investment. There is, therefore, a real possibility that reverse causality exists. By this, we mean that it is possible that private output and private inputs may be leading the evolution of public capital.
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